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Differences That Matter: Canada, the United States and Environmental
Policymaking
By Leslie R. Alm and Ross E. Burkhart
Introduction
Does the way Canada, as a nation state, approach international environmental
policymaking make a difference with respect to solving environmental problems in the
Americas? We argue that it does, and it is a difference that matters. Canadian efforts
toward multilateralism and toward inclusiveness (e.g., willingness to work with weaker
nations) serve as a counter balance to the growing unilateralism and ever present
exceptionalism of the United States, currently the most powerful country in the world,
and Canada’s southern neighbor and regional partner in developing environmental policy
that affects the northern Americas directly and all of the Americas indirectly. Our
argument is made first generally, and then specifically using involvement and reaction to
the goals set out by the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), where, along
with Mexico, Canada and the United States play leading roles. The basic contention of
this paper is that the vision for and goals of the CEC are much more aligned with the way
Canada perceives the way international environmental policymaking should be
implemented, and that by fostering that vision, Canada tries to counter the tendency of
the present-day United States administration to go at it alone, and thereby provides a
linkage to other countries in the Americas to position themselves for participation in
regional environmental policymaking.
The CEC was created under the auspices of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), a separate agreement between Canada, Mexico,
and the United States stemming from concern for the environment in the context of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As portrayed by government officials
in Canada and the United States and as documented by such NAFTA analysts as Andre
Beaulieu, Daniel C. Esty, Barbara B. Hogenboom, Stewart Hudson, Pierre Marc Johnson,
Ardadhana Kumar, Jean Milner, Annie Petsonk, J. Timmons Roberts, and David Vogel,
NAFTA is considered one of the “greenest” multilateral trade agreements ever
concluded.1 The reasons for such acclaim rests with the heavy emphasis on
environmental considerations that arose with the creation of the CEC, which is
considered to be the first international organization in the world that specifically links
environmental cooperation with trade relations. 2
The CEC works through three major entities: (1) the Council, which is the governing
body of the CEC and composed of the highest-ranking environmental authorities from
Canada, the United States, and Mexico; (2) the Secretariat, which is located in Montreal
and implements the annual work program by providing administrative, technical and
operational support to the Council; and (3) the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC),
which advises the Council on any matters pertinent to the scope of NAAEC and is
composed of five citizens from each of the three countries.
The mission of the CEC is to
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[facilitate] cooperation and public participation to foster
conservation, protection and enhancement of the North
American environment for the benefit of present and future
generations, in the context of increasing economic, trade
and social links among Canada, Mexico, and the United
States.3
Indeed, the CEC is viewed as an international model because of “its provisions for public
participation and for the unprecedented commitment by the three governments to account
internationally for enforcement of their environmental laws.” 4 Essentially, the CEC
represents a regional model of developing and implementing environmental policy across
the North American continent.
The Setting: Global Environmental Politics
There appears no doubt that we now live in an era of global environmental politics,5
with an increasing focus on global environmental issues,6 an increased integration of
economic and environmental measures at the international level,7 and a proliferation of
new multilateral environmental treaties, declarations, strategies, and organizations.8 As
Martello and Jasanoff state, “The proliferation of multilateral environmental agreements
in the last quarter of the twentieth century attests to the wholesale adoption of shared
environmental ontologies among the nations of the Earth.” 9 Mol puts this trend into
perspective when he speaks of
the construction of global, multilateral or supra-national
environmental organizations, institutions, and regimes as
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instruments to contribute to environmental reform of a
globalizing world.10
There even appears to be a move to push environmental responsibilities away from
the nation-state and more toward international bodies, states or provinces, and localities.11
Jasanoff and Martello warn however, “there cannot be a meaningfully accountable, let
alone a democratic, global order without making room for voices and epistemologies
organized at levels below the global.”12 In this same vein, Lipschutz argues that local and
global are so closely bound with respect to environmental politics that understanding one
without the other would not be possible,13 and Mol posits that globalization, in
conjunction with the decentralization and localization of environmental governance and
reform, has led to new political arrangements at the national, sub-national, and
supranational levels.14
Despite the move toward the internationalization of environmental policymaking,15
nation-state domestic policymaking remains crucial in the global arena,16 where it is
pointedly characterized as “the most important pathway to change.” 17 Because the
existing network of global environmental regimes is looked upon as “woefully
inadequate to meet global environmental challenges” 18 and environmental standards
found in voluntary international agreements are seldom backed up with sanctions for
noncompliance,19 sovereign nation-states are still viewed as the single most important
determinants with respect to redirecting “societies and economies along more
ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems.” 20 With this in mind, the
sections that follow highlight the styles of Canada and the United States as each looks to
influence environmental policy in the Americas and the world.
The Canada–United States Divergence
It is at the junction between the nation-state and global governance that Canada and
the United States take substantially different turns. The United States, explicitly
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described as “the crusading hegemon” 21 displaying “increasingly muscular American
unilateralism,” 22 appears to be heading down a road that emphasizes unilateral
geopolitics,23 while Canada remains committed to following a path firmly committed to
multilateral institutions.24
Cox describes the movement of the United States toward a unipolar concept of world
power, founded on what Americans view as their exceptional historic mission:
“American ‘exceptionalism’ affirms in practice that the United States is not a state like all
the others and that American officials, the agents of this special responsibility, cannot be
subject to other than United States law”.25 Representing its unilateral tendencies at the
international level, the United States administration—characterized as “the leading point
of resistance” 26 and as “a laggard in international environmental politics27—has
dismissed the Kyoto accord on international warming, the biological weapons
convention, and the United Nations agreement on small arms trafficking.28 This blatant
rejection of multilateralism by the United States—viewed by many as “casting a pall over
the prospects for ambitious multilateral environmental diplomacy” 29—runs counter to
Canada’s vocal and enthusiastic support for such a rule-based international system.30
Hawes describes Canada’s position quite accurately:
For more than fifty years two basic and interrelated facts
have shaped and subsequently characterized Canada’s role
in the world. The first is the disproportionately large role
that the United States has played in the economic, social,
cultural, and political lives of Canadians. The second is a
significant commitment to the principles and the practice of
multilateral diplomacy and multilateral management.31
In this regard, it appears that many Canadians share a dislike for President George W.
Bush and his administration. Moreover, this dislike is “broadly shared geographically and
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conceptually—across [Canada] and across a wide range of issues.” 32 For instance, over
80 percent of Canadians believe that the Chrétien government made the correct decision
in deciding not to participate in the 2003 Iraq War, and a further 76 percent of Canadians
believe that the federal government has been too soft in its negotiations with the United
States on resolving the softwood lumber dispute.33 At least part of the reason for this
dislike is reflected in Bush’s clear and unequivocal statements that reflect the belief that
if multilateral initiatives are such that they are not pursued in a way acceptable to the way
the President views the world, the United States will not participate.34
Canada appears to have accepted the simple fact that in today’s world, as has
historically been true, it plays “a relatively insignificant role in the dynamics of great
power rivalry.” 35 Put another way, Canada has come to recognize that it has become “a
functional part of ‘Empire,’” 36 where ‘Empire’ refers to the United States as the
dominant military and economic power in the world today. “If Canada’s role in the world
seemed to be defined more and more by its relationship with the United States, that’s
because it is.” 37 Having said that, Canada remains committed to a multilateral view of
the world in hopes of offsetting its absorption into the ‘Empire.’ 38 Along these lines,
Canada takes special pride in its multicultural society, as it views itself in this light as “a
microcosm of the whole world,” 39 with a strong multilateral heritage based on
multilateral rule-making and institution-building.40
A generally accepted assumption on the part of Canadians is that the United States
will “always accord their country consideration when calculating the American
interest.”41 Thompson takes issue with the validity of this assumption, describing
Canada’s relationship with the United States in the same terms that the United States has
with all other nations, “uni-lateral.” 42 Simply put, Thompson sees the eternal hopefulness
of Canadians that the United States can be constrained within a multilateral international
regime as quite misplaced.43
Canadian foreign policy has, to be sure, employed unilateralism and bilateralism
instead of multilateralism. The famous 1911 general election that swept the Liberals of
Sir Wilfrid Laurier (who favored trade reciprocity with the United States) from power in
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Ottawa demonstrates the appeal of Canadian unilateralism.44 In addition, the Ogdensburg
Agreement of 1940, which cemented a bilateral defense bond between Canada and the
United States, excluding Britain, also demonstrates how Canada has adapted its foreign
policies to fit the times.45 At present, however, according to Canada’s International
Policy Statement, “multilateral cooperation remains the only way to tackle some of the
world’s most pressing problems, such as environmental degradation or global financial
instability. Collective action is the only viable path to a lasting solution.” 46
In fact, a strain of thought in Canadian foreign policy circles questions the relevancy
of a foreign policy partnership with the United States. Canada’s lack of investment in
foreign policy has caused it to decline in both power and prestige. “Without real
resources, it is harder for Canada to be taken seriously these days in London and
Washington, in NATO and at the UN. It no longer speaks with the same authority in the
international community.” 47 Just in October 2005 alone, Canada has been criticized on
four international fronts on which it would ordinarily have carried great weight and
respect. Amnesty International released a report which took the government to task for
the deportation of people to states known to practice torture.48 Transparency International
ranked Canada 14th on the Corruptions Perceptions Index, a decline for the third straight
year.49 The Conference Board of Canada chided Canada for lack of action to arrest the
decline in productivity, dropping to 12th place in economic performance.50 Pollution
Watch issued a report that faulted Canada for its lack of movement in reducing air
pollution: between 1995 and 2003, Canada reduced its emissions by 1.8 percent, while
the United States reduced its emissions by 45 percent.51 In short, critics of Canadian
foreign policy conclude that Canada has not proven it should be taken seriously as a
foreign policy actor; rhetoric is no substitute for constructive action.
Along these same lines, Clarkson and Banda document the recent emergence of a
United States-centered bilateralism that minimizes the prospects for any type of
continental convergence occurring in North America.52 Furthermore, Segal claims that
North American integration has not, and never will be, a central element of the United
States domestic debate.53 Instead, “U.S. political institutions within the paradigm of
North American regional integration…are here to stay.” 54 Hart gets right to the point,
insisting that Canadians, especially, must be careful about making sure they are engaged
44
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at all levels, as there appears to be a natural tendency, without this engagement, to “drift
toward United States-determined default positions.” 55
Still, Canadians cling to a strategy of hopefulness, “increasingly reaching across
borders to network with allies, to lobby governments and corporations that have dealings
with the Canadian government, and to bring external pressures to bear on the Canadian
government.” 56 They put their faith in the commonly accepted belief that “the degree of
global interdependence is now such that even superpowers need the cooperation of other
states in the longer run.” 57
Canadians can take some measure of hope in this regard, as many foresee a rise of
environmental multilateralism, characterized by “the emergence of environmental
advocacy within civil society and of new democratic discursive designs within the
administrative state.” 58 Canadians can take heart in what some believe to be a move
toward greater influence for multilateralism in the environmental realm:
[M]obilizing at the domestic level can have important
multilateral consequences over time, as a small number of
relatively green democratic states emerge to take leadership
roles in multilateral negotiations, and whose credibility
rests in part on their successful domestic environmental
initiatives and records.59
At this time in history it appears that Canadians, as a whole, appear less threatened by
their relationship to the United States—viewing their proximity in a positive light, as
something to take advantage of rather than to feel threatened by.60 Perhaps this optimism
comes from the fact that Canada and the United States not only share fundamental values
and goals,61 but also share a vital interest in their relationship; a relationship built on
mutual trust and confidence.62
Americans as a whole remain unaware and uninterested in the United States–Canada
relationship as well as Canada and Canadians in general.63 On the northern side of the
border, anti-Americanism remains a staple of Canadian thought and perceptions.64
Moreover, Canadians continually point to the uniqueness of their country (as compared to
the United States):
the official constitutional enshrinement of both French–
English biculturalism and multiculturalism; a more
55
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welcoming attitude to immigrants; a more generous welfare
state that includes a national health care delivery system;
the existence of a social democratic party and a more
effective labor movement; more generous government
recognition of native peoples; livable cities in which
citizens experience much lower levels of urban violence;
and effective gun laws and a murder rate a tenth of that in
America.65
Canada As An International Environmental Leader
Despite the fact that economic globalism has seemingly diminished Canada’s
capacity to engage in across-the-board, proactive multilateralism, Canada continues to
push an environmental agenda that reflects the pursuit of what some argue are purely
Canadian values—the pursuit and promotion of the virtues of multilateralism and
international institutions.66 In this light, Canada has used the international stage for the
germination of environmental policy ideas, gaining a “positive international image on the
environmental front.” 67 For instance, during the acid rain debate that permeated the
1980s and early 1990s, the Canadian government invited ten nations to Ottawa for a twoday International Conference of Ministers that resulted in the formation of the 30 Percent
Club, a group of nations agreeing to reduce SO2 emissions by 30 percent over ten years.68
Moreover, Canada was one of only a few nations that made a pledge to unilaterally
reduce SO2 emissions by 50 percent.69 Over the years it has been actions of this type—
where Canada has advocated for progressive environmental solutions—that has earned
Canada the reputation of being an active environmental policy entrepreneur.70
Canadians view global leadership with respect to environmental protection as a way
to gain prestige within the world community and take pride in their efforts to bring about
global environmental cooperation. They perceive themselves as “enthusiastic joiner[s] of
international agreements” and embodied with “a strong internationalist tradition.” 71 At
the state level, Canada draws on a reservoir of “internationally recognized contributions
to global environmental leadership,” 72 with governments around the world increasingly
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looking toward Canada “as the world’s most successful pluralist state.” 73 Furthermore,
Canada pursues its domestic environmental policy goals through international means and
uses its middle-power statecraft as a way to affect policy change in the international
arena,74 gaining “a reputation as one of the world’s most ecologically minded nations.” 75
This tendency toward multilateral relations is characterized as an “intrinsic,
substantial, and growing feature of environmental policy in Canada,” 76 one that plays
directly to the values that Canadians believe are the foundation of their existence—the
rule of law, liberty, democracy, equality of opportunity, and fairness.77 Wood sums up
Canada’s unique view toward the world outside its borders:
Canada…does not get its influence from power but from
cooperation, supporting proposals, enthusiasm, forming
coalitions, willingness to work with weaker nations, and
contributing more than its fair share. Canada has a focus on
values like understanding the social aspects of
globalization; a need for a fair process to ensure
legitimization; a sharing of the burdens and the focus on
legitimization.78
Still, Canada is not sitting idly by, waiting for this special status to somehow appear
without warning. Canada continually reaches out to the international community in ways
that build upon its commitment to improving its status and influence at the global level,
as well as with the United States. Canada clearly recognizes its asymmetric relationship
with its powerful neighbor and looks beyond its borders for ways to foster values
important to the Canadian way of life while, at the same time, gaining some leverage in
its bilateral relations with the United States and influence on the international stage.
There is a glaring weakness to the Canadian position on the environment, however:
the gap between Canadian rhetoric and reality has been considerable at times. For
example, Canada’s lofty statements regarding the Kyoto Agreement are not matched by
equally ambitious policies. In fact, Canada’s position on Kyoto “was only slightly
‘greener’ for symbolic purposes” than that of the United States.79 Also, Canada’s ranking
in global environmental performance has been rated mediocre at best by several global
environmental tracking organizations. The most recent, The David Suzuki Foundation’s
The Maple Leaf in the OECD: Comparing Progress Toward Sustainability, ranked
Canada 28th out of 30 OECD countries in environmental performance, based on an
73
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assessment of such goals as shifting to cleaner forms of energy, reducing waste and
pollution, and protection of water source and conservation.80
Canadian Values and the CEC
Based on the discussion above, it appears that international environmental
policymaking, because of its necessarily cooperative orientation, becomes more desirable
to countries like Canada than the United States. Simply put, the different orientations
toward international politics espoused by Canada and the United States serve to
differentiate their approaches to international environmental policymaking. Canada tends
toward multilateralism, inclusiveness, and global interdependence, with a firm
commitment to multilateral institutions and multilateral rule making. The United States
tends toward unilateralism and exceptionalism, with an emphasis toward unilateral
geopolitics and a belief that the United States will not be subjected to any other rules than
United States law. However, if the United States’ law does not conflict with international
law, then the international law will be followed. This is clearly not the case with the
softwood lumber dispute, “which has led some Canadians to question whether the United
States will comply with NAFTA if decisions by the dispute settlement mechanism run
counter to private U.S. interests.” 81
Highlighting these divergent approaches to environmental policymaking at the
international level, it is our goal to use the context of CEC—as defined by the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)—to show that the goals
of the CEC are more aligned with Canada’s view of how we should approach regional
environmental integration in the Americas. Furthermore, in completing such a
comparison, we hypothesize that Canada’s actions in pursuing its multilateral agenda
through the CEC has put Canada in a position to serve as a conduit for other countries in
the Americas to participate with the United States in a meaningful way in formulating
environmental policymaking in the region and hemisphere.
We use three major documents to conduct a straightforward analysis regarding
Canadian values and the goals and vision of the CEC: the draft of the Strategic Plan of
the Joint Public Advisory Committee 2006-2010 (November, 2005); the Strategic Plan of
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2005-2010 (17 June 2005) and the
Report of the Ten-year Review and Assessment Committee to the Council of the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (15 June 2004).82 The draft JPAC Strategic
Plan was designed to supplement the CEC’s strategic plan and is based on the principles
of transparency, outreach, and engagement. The Strategic Plan of the CEC purports to
provide a vision for the future of the CEC as well as setting priorities for the CEC’s longterm viability. The Ten-year Review provides a comprehensive critique of the CEC
authored by six individuals: Pierre Marc Johnson and Robert Page of Canada, Jennifer A.
80
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Haverkamp and John F. Mizroch of the United States, and Daniel Basurto and Blanca
Torres of Mexico. The report offers both an assessment of the CEC and recommendations
for the future.
Throughout the earlier sections of this manuscript we have cited many descriptions of
how Canada and the United States are perceived with respect to their outlooks on
approaching environmental policymaking at the international level. The United States
was described within the context of such terminology as unilateralism, American
exceptionalism, and U.S.-centered bilateralism, while Canada was described in terms of
such things as multilateralism, inclusiveness, and global interdependence. What we do
next is delineate some of the words commonly used throughout the draft of JPAC’s
Strategic Plan, the CEC’s Strategic Plan and Ten-year Review to show that these
documents, and hence the CEC, tends more toward the Canadian outlook than the United
States’ outlook.
The Draft JPAC Strategic Plan
•
•

promotes “continental cooperation”
advocates building “a tri-national model of collaboration, consensus building, and
consensus-based results”

The Strategic Plan of the CEC
• proclaims the need to “build bridges among the three countries to promote
environmental collaboration”
• establishes the CEC as a way to “facilitate cooperation on the conservation,
protection, and enhancement of the North American environment”
• refers to the CEC Council operating “on the basis of consensus”
• declares a need for “regional and national coordination”
• describes the CEC as “a forum through which we can discuss and facilitate
regional action on our common global commitments”
The Ten-year Review
• speaks of “the unprecedented commitment by the three governments to account
internationally for the enforcement of their environmental laws”
• promotes the CEC as an “international model”
• asserts that the CEC facilitates “more fluid cooperation among the Parties…and
their various stakeholder groups by broadening their relationships and increasing
the number and range of their contracts”
• highlights the importance of “a North American environmental community”
• notes the CEC’s presence as a “safe harbor” forum to discuss issues and a “neutral
forum” for examining emerging and complex issues
• remarks on North America as “a collection of linked ecosystems”
• maintains that part of the mission of the CEC is to “create a sense of regional
environmental consciousness”
• expresses the hope that the countries can work on a “consensual basis” while
pursuing “a trilateral agenda that at least purports to benefit all three countries
equally” along “a common agenda”
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Further, in commenting upon the CEC’s weaknesses and failures, the Ten-year Review
•
•
•
•

posits that the main CEC stakeholders “have not been able to develop a common
vision about the CEC mandate or their respective roles”
proclaims the United States as “the dominant partner” with “greater influence”
criticizes the fact that, even after a decade of efforts, the three countries still
“pursue their trade and environmental policies largely separately rather than
through the CEC”
points out that “United States agencies still see little value added in the CEC for
their program areas” and that the “interest of United States NGOs [in the CEC]
has declined”

We believe there is a clear pattern of ideas and concepts that pervade the CEC
mission and goals as demonstrated by its public reports. Words and phrases such as
building bridges, promotion of environmental collaboration, facilitating cooperation,
consensus building, broadening relationships, consensual decision-making, and common
agenda all relate to Canada’s emphasis on inclusiveness with respect to environmental
policy making. Words and phrases such as North American environment, common global
commitment, and common vision relate to Canada’s emphasis on global interdependence.
Words and phrases such as regional coordination, international accountability,
international models, North American environmental community, and regional
environmental consciousness relate to Canada’s emphasis on multilateralism. In short, the
mission and goals of the CEC are a strong reflection of the values and ideals that Canada
brings to the bargaining table.
The Canadian Difference
Canada and the United States share a rich tradition of cooperation with respect to
environmental policymaking. In fact, Canada and the United States have been partners in
some of the world’s oldest international environmental treaties.83 This tradition is being
carried forward within the trilateral framework of NAFTA, with “huge importance”
placed on environmental cooperation.84 Yet, despite the impact of NAFTA, governance
in North America appears to be comprised of “asymmetric dyads” entrenched within a
system of bilateralism.85 The bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States
remains a potent force in all policymaking,86 albeit, it is a bilateral relationship of
disproportionate framing, with United States domestic policy serving as the driving
force.87
Having said all that, Canada—through its ever-present efforts to push the values of
multilateralism and inclusiveness—plays a substantial role in promoting the need for
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solving environmental problems within a regional or international context, rather than
relying solely on the seemingly entrenched system of bilateralism. Canada does so in two
major ways that have influence within the Americas. First, Canada plays a highly visible
and public role in regional and international environmental policy venues. Moreover,
there is concrete evidence that the values that Canada portrays as important are being
institutionalized in the processes of organizations (e.g., the CEC) whose primary mission
is to ensure that environmental protection remains a central consideration in all North
American policymaking. The draft of the JPAC Strategic Plan, the Strategic Plan of the
CEC and the Ten-year Review of the CEC (as documented above) reflect the values that
Canada portrays as necessary to solving environmental problems across the Americas.
Clearly, the goals and mission of the CEC tend toward collaboration and coordination
within a framework of consensus among many countries, with no single country attaining
a position of dominance within the organization.
While it is easy to argue that the actual implementation of environmental policy
within the CEC remains skewed toward United States domestic policymaking (as noted
by the criticism delineated in the Ten-year Review), the simple fact remains that the
language defining how the CEC is to be organized and administered represents
multilateral ideals at their best. This is no small accomplishment. The United States has
signed on to work within this framework and despite the United States tendency to go its
own way at times, to retain some semblance of credibility, the United States still must
respond to the rules that govern the CEC in a meaningful way. And these are rules that
encompass a common (not unilateral) vision for environmental policymaking.
The second way that Canada influences environmental policy in the Americas is by
serving as a role model for how other countries can approach the influence and power of
the United States. There certainly is not any doubt that the United States plays the
dominant role in policymaking across the world today (including the Americas), be it
economically, militarily, or environmentally. Within this current system of policymaking,
Canada manages to publicize its strong commitment to multilateral values as a counterbalance to the unilateral power of the United States. Further, Canada does so within the
context of maintaining a close, friendly, and respectful relationship with the United
States.
Bilateral-type relationships remain the way the United States likes to deal with its
regional partners. However, the United States is being pulled more and more in the
direction of regional affiliations that recognize the value of consensus building and
participation by all countries on equal terms. This is certainly true in the Americas. This
movement, in our opinion, is in no small way related to the persistence of Canada in
using its unique relationship with the United States to champion multilateralism over
unilateralism and inclusiveness over exceptionalism.
In this regard, Canada has chosen to remain engaged with the United States at all
levels. While Canada retains its important bilateral linkages to the United States, it also
continues to actively push the United States toward the ideals of multilateralism. Canada
values the recognition it receives within the world community as both a leader in
environmental protection and a country willing to work with weaker nations. Canada uses
this recognition, along with its proximity and strong positive ties with the United States,
to champion the ideals of multilateralism as one way the United States (and all other
countries in the Americas) can address domestic and regional environmental problems. In
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doing so, Canada brings external pressure on the United States to at least recognize the
values that are important to other countries in the Americas, all of which are considerably
weaker than the United States in most important considerations. In essence, Canada—
because of its unique position vis-a vis the United States and its public rhetoric
trumpeting inclusiveness, cooperation, and interdependence—offers hope that positive
multilateral engagement with the United States is a realistic possibility.
It is certainly too strong a statement to say that the United States will soon abandon
the way it unilaterally views the world and accept Canada’s slant on the benefits of
multilateralism. But in hopes of ultimately changing the tone of the debate in its favor,
Canada continues to push its multilateral values onto the North American environmental
policymaking agenda through its active participation in NAFTA, NAAEC, and the CEC.
In this way, Canada can confront the United States and its immense powers within
institutions designed to treat nations on an equal basis. While these efforts may not bring
about instantaneous changes in United States policy positions, it does allow for Canada to
openly espouse its views in hopes of bringing about such change. This use of multilateral
institutions by Canada to foster values it considers important should not be overlooked by
other countries in the Americas hoping to become part of the environmental
policymaking process.
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